Brief for the United States: Third Annual Pace National Environmental Moot Court Competition by Roth, Karen et al.
Pace Environmental Law Review
Volume 8
Issue 2 Spring 1991 Article 8
April 1991
Brief for the United States: Third Annual Pace
National Environmental Moot Court Competition
Arizona State University College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace
Environmental Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Arizona State University College of Law, Brief for the United States: Third Annual Pace National
Environmental Moot Court Competition, 8 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 549 (1991)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol8/iss2/8
No. 90-453
IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TWELFTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
V.
CHARLES CANNER,
and
BERNARD BARKER,
Appellee.
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the district of New Union
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES*
College of Law
Arizona State University
Tempe, Arizona 85287
Counsel for United States
Karen Roth
Mark Siegel
James Stipanuk
* The winning briefs published in this issue are reprinted in thier original form.
No changes have been made by the editorial staff of the Pace Environmental Law
Review.
1
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. Whether knowingly omitting material information about a
hazardous waste spill in an oral report to the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency violates section 3008(d)(3) of the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).
II. Whether a plant manager who authorizes a materially in-
complete report and a company president who creates
conditions conducive to environmental violations, while
insulating himself from environmental law requirements,
are legally responsible for corporate conduct violating
RCRA section 3008(d)(3).
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Statement of the Facts
Omni Manufacturing Company (Omni) builds hypercom-
puters, the latest generation of computer technology. (R. 1).
In every sense, Omni is appellant Charles Canner's company.
He founded it in 1982 and has served as its only president. (R.
1).
Omni's corporate culture embodies Canner's unmistaka-
ble bottom-line focus. Documents issuing from his office con-
tain his famous "Three Commandments of Business Success":
"1. Pay attention to profits. 2. Pay still more attention to
profits. 3. If you're paying attention to anything but profits,
you probably shouldn't be." (R. 2). He has instructed his staff
not to distract him with correspondence unless it directly re-
lates to Omni's suppliers, customers, or production levels. (R.
3).
Canner handles other matters, such as the plant's compli-
ance with environmental, occupational safety, health, and civil
rights regulations, by having his staff divert them to appellant
Bernard Barker, Omni's plant manager. (R. 3). Canner's rela-
tive lack of interest in Omni's treatment of environmental
matters is reflected in the brief two-sentence acknowledge-
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ment of environmental regulations in his company's proce-
dures manual: "Environmental laws are important. The presi-
dent expects all Omni employees to comply with them at all
times." (R. 3).
As plant manager, Barker's duties extend to all aspects of
the manufacturing plant. (R. 2). He is in charge of fulfilling
Omni's environmental responsibilities, including the handling
of hazardous waste. (R. 2).
On June 26, 1989, New Union City policeman Edward
Egger was on routine patrol when he noticed an Omni truck
leaking a yellowish liquid onto a grassy shoulder outside the
plant. (R. 2). Before he could reach the truck and speak to its
driver, the truck disappeared in the City's heavy midday traf-
fic. (R. 2).
A few days later, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) regional office in New Union City began receiving com-
plaints from several neighborhood residents about chemical
odors emanating from outside the Omni plant. (R. 3). EPA
Inspector Durden visited the site and found the odors' source
in a three-foot patch of dying vegetation near the plant's
street gate. (R. 3). She sent a soil sample to the EPA labora-
tory for analysis. (R.3). The laboratory found a high concen-
tration of DWE, a byproduct of Omni's manufacturing opera-
tions and also a hazardous waste within the meaning of the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). RCRA §
1004(5), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1988). (R. 3).
On August 2, 1989, Inspector Durden wrote a letter to
Canner at Omni to inform him that the EPA was investigating
the DWE spill and to ask him if he knew the spill's source. (R.
3). The letter never reached Canner because he previously had
instructed his staff not to show him such correspondence. (R.
3-4). Accordingly, a staff member routed the letter directly to
Barker along with a pre-printed label instructing him to take
"appropriate action in accordance with standing company pol-
icies and procedures." (R. 3).
Barker summoned Arnold Adams, his twenty-three year
old facilities manager, to his office to discuss the letter. (R. 4).
Adams gave Barker considerable information regarding the
spill. He told Barker that one of the company's trucks had
1991]
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been pulled from service for repair of a leak in the cargo area.
(R. 4). He thought that the truck could have been the spill's
source, because Omni trucks regularly deliver DWE to a
nearby hazardous waste recycler. (R. 4). Adams recalled that a
load of DWE had been taken to the recycler in late June, just
before the truck went in for repairs. (R. 4). In addition, he
noted that other firms' trucks also delivered DWE to the re-
cycler and in doing so sometimes passed by Omni's street
gate. (R. 4).
Adams offered to interview the truck driver and service
crew regarding the spill, but Barker cut him off, saying,
"That's not our job." (R. 4). As to the EPA inquiry, Barker
directed Adams to telephone Durden, but to say as little as
possible. (R. 4). He admonished Adams to be careful of what
he said and not to volunteer anything, but to stop short of an
outright lie. (R. 4). Barker warned him, that if Omni spent
time chasing down leads for the EPA, the company would
never make money. (R. 4).
Adams obeyed Barker's instructions to a fault. On August
9, he telephoned Inspector Durden and reported, "About your
letter of August 2: we do not know the source of the spill. Of
course, you can always visit here if you want to." (R. 4). This
abbreviated response left Durden without a single lead to pur-
sue. (R. 4).
Her investigation might still be on hold, but for a chance
occurrence during the following week. On August 16, Durden
made a presentation on environmental crimes to the local po-
lice force. (R. 4) Coincidentally, Officer Egger was in attend-
ance. (R. 4). After Durden's presentation, Egger told her
about the Omni truck he had seen leaking yellowish liquid on
the grass outside the plant. (R. 4).
The next day, Inspector Durden telephoned Adams and
confronted him with Officer Egger's revelation. (R. 4). This
time, Adams was more responsive, telling Durden, "You know,
I thought that might have happened." (R. 4). He then re-
vealed all he knew about the leaking truck, and invited her to
check company records and to interview the truck's driver and
service crew. (R. 4). Durden subsequently confirmed that the
leaking truck had been carrying DWE on the date of the spill.
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(R. 5). The EPA laboratory verified that a sample scraped
from the truck's underside contained DWE. (R. 5).
The probe ultimately resulted in charges being brought
against Canner and Barker. (R. 5). Because Adams cooperated
with the investigation, the government did not charge him
along with the other two. (R. 5). Adams resigned his position
at Omni shortly thereafter. (R. 5).
B. The Proceedings Below
In a joint criminal trial in the United States District
Court for the District of New Union, a jury convicted Charles
Canner and Bernard Barker of omitting material information
in a report to the EPA, a violation of RCRA section
3008(d)(3). 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(3). In a motion for acquittal
notwithstanding the jury's verdict, the defendants unsuccess-
fully argued that no crime had been committed. The court
struck down defendants' argument that "report" under sec-
tion 3008(d)(3) only refers to written material; a telephone re-
sponse to an EPA inquiry is a report. The court further found
that the defendants knew or should have known that this re-
port withheld material information. Moreover, the court de-
termined that RCRA does not require the EPA to volunteer
the specific purpose for which it needs requested information
to trigger the statute's reporting requirement.
After upholding the jury's conclusion that a crime had
been committed, the district court confirmed the guilt of both
defendants. The court denied defendants' claim that the "re-
sponsible corporate officer" doctrine could not be applied to
them under RCRA. The court upheld Canner's liability be-
cause, as Omni's president, he was ultimately responsible for
his company's compliance with environmental regulations.
The court found Barker's conviction reasonable under two
theories. First, the court held Barker knew that an EPA re-
port for which he was responsible omitted information mate-
rial to RCRA enforcement. Second, the court also recognized
Barker's guilt under the "responsible corporate officer"
doctrine.
The district court denied defendants' motions for judg-
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ment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict. They appealed
to this court.
II. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Congress passed RCRA to control the serious threat of
hazardous waste to the health and welfare of Americans. To
achieve this goal, Congress authorized the EPA to conduct in-
spections and gather information, and passed section
3008(d)(3) authorizing criminal sanctions against individuals
who withhold material information needed for enforcement.
Criminal sanctions against corporate officers are particularly
important for achieving the EPA's objectives because these
officers often try to evade their responsibility for policies that
result in hazardous waste pollution by blaming the actual vio-
lations on underlings. Additionally, wealthy corporations sim-
ply absorb civil sanctions and fines as a cost of doing business
that is more economical than complying with environmental
regulations.
In this case, an Omni employee violated RCRA section
3008(d)(3) by knowingly omitting material information in a
report to an EPA inspector about a DWE spill. The inspector
wrote Omni asking about the source of the spill outside its
front gate. The employee knew he was concealing information
from the inspector when he answered only, "[W]e do not
know the source of the spill." The employee knew that a com-
pany truck had been leaking at the time of the spill, that the
truck might have been carrying the specific chemical identi-
fied by the inspector in her inquiry, and that the truck might
have been at the spill site. He reported these facts to his supe-
rior, plant manager Bernard Barker, and offered to make a
relatively simple investigation of the matter. Barker told him
specifically not to do so, and instructed him not to volunteer
any information to the EPA.
Under law, this information is "material" to the EPA's
enforcement of RCRA because it influences the EPA's func-
tioning. If the employee had given the EPA inspector the in-
formation when she asked for it, she could have discovered
the source of the spill quickly and easily and avoided a poten-
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tial threat to public health. Omni's failure to cooperate
stopped the EPA investigation in its tracks, thus impairing
the agency's function.
Defendants argue that section 3008(d)(3) does not con-
cern oral reports. Given Congress' intent to prevent misinfor-
mation regarding hazardous waste, it makes little difference
whether a report is written or verbal. When enumerating the
categories of information to which section 3008(d)(3) sanc-
tions should apply, Congress encompassed the likely range of
communications between agency and industry, including "re-
ports," whether written or oral.
Nor does section 3008(d)(3) require an EPA investigator
to announce that she is inquiring "for purposes of compliance
with" RCRA. If defendants truly were baffled about why an
EPA inspector would inquire about a toxic spill at their front
gate, they could have asked. The record does not report any
confusion by Omni's officers on this point. They knew the in-
spector was investigating a possible violation of environmental
regulations.
Barker, the plant manager, is guilty of violating section
3008(d)(3) under two theories. First, Barker was directly re-
sponsible for answering the EPA inquiry and directed his
subordinate to answer it in terms that amounted to a violation
of RCRA. Barker cannot disown the statement because he in-
structed an employee to speak the words for him, or because
he instructed the employee to respond verbally rather than in
writing. Barker had specific knowledge of the material infor-
mation omitted by this report, and acted knowingly for pur-
poses of scienter because he knew his conduct would frustrate
the EPA investigation.
Second, Barker is guilty as a responsible corporate officer
even if he had no specific knowledge or intent to deceive the
EPA. Because RCRA is a public welfare statute, individuals
such as plant managers have an affirmative duty to seek out
and remedy hazardous waste problems. By burying his head
in the sand, Barker exhibited precisely the kind of behavior
the responsible corporate officer doctrine is designed to deter.
Charles Canner is also guilty of violating RCRA section
3008(d)(3) under the responsible corporate officer doctrine. As
1991]
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Omni's president, Canner had a positive duty to seek out and
remedy violations of RCRA as well as to implement measures
to insure that violations did not occur. Canner's self-imposed
isolation from environmental matters is no defense to his fail-
ure to fulfill these duties. It is an admission of his guilt. The
Supreme Court repeatedly has held that corporate officers
may not escape their responsibilities to public health and wel-
fare by delegating them to others. Additionally, Canner's in-
doctrination of his employees with his business philosophy en-
shrining corporate profit at the expense of all other
considerations created the working conditions that gave rise
to Omni's RCRA violation.
Barker and Canner both are responsible for Omni's viola-
tion of RCRA. Their convictions were reasonable and proper
under RCRA section 3008(d)(3) and accord with both legisla-
tive intent for and judicial interpretation of the laws gov-
erning hazardous waste management. This Court should up-
hold both convictions.
III. ARGUMENT
A. RCRA's Evolution Supports the Criminal Prosecu-
tion of Corporate Officers for Reporting Violations.
Congress passed RCRA specifically to control hazardous
waste, because improper management and disposal of that
waste can cause devastating illness or death. RCRA §
1004(5)(A)-(B), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5)(A)-(B) (1988). Prior to
the enactment of RCRA in 1976, hazardous waste was essen-
tially unregulated by existing federal and state law. Schnapf,
State Hazardous Waste Programs Under the Federal Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act, 12 Envtl. L. 679
(1982). Noting this lack of regulation and the increasingly se-
rious national waste disposal problem,1 Congress instructed
the EPA to conscientiously enforce RCRA's comprehensive,
1. At that time, between three and four billion tons of toxic wastes were gener-
ated each year, and were anticipated to increase rapidly. H.R. Rep. No. 1491, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 6238, 6239.
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"cradle-to-grave" federal regulatory scheme governing hazard-
ous waste management. H.R. Rep. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 11, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
6238, 6249.
In order to achieve RCRA's goal, Congress has authorized
the EPA to mount inspections and to gather information from
individuals and entities involved with hazardous waste. RCRA
§ 3007(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6927(a) (1988). Anyone who impedes
the EPA's inquisitorial authority under RCRA section 3007(a)
may be subject to criminal liability under RCRA section 3008.
Today, any person who knowingly omits material information
or makes a false material statement or representation under
this subchapter is subject to a fine of up to $50,000 for each
day of violation or imprisonment for up to two years. RCRA §
3008(d), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1988).
1. RCRA's enhancement of criminal enforcement is
necessary to combat the serious threat of hazard-
ous waste.
Such broad criminal penalties were absent at the incep-
tion of our country's first series of modern environmental
laws. The EPA had just been born, and these new statutes
were scientifically complex and difficult to administer. Hab-
icht, The Federal Perspective on Environmental Criminal
Enforcement: How to Remain on the Civil Side, 17 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,478, 10,478 (1987). The regulated in-
dustries had not yet developed an adequate understanding of
their new statutory duties, and courts initially would have had
trouble instituting criminal sanctions based on these techni-
cally detailed statutes. Id. For these reasons, Congress origi-
nally focused mainly on civil remedies for environmental en-
forcement. Id.
The need for criminal enforcement of environmental stat-
utes evolved with the increasing public and congressional
awareness that the country's toxic waste disposal practices
were out of control and rapidly becoming a real and immedi-
ate threat to public health. Harris, Criminal Liability for Vio-
lations of Federal Hazardous Waste Law: The "Knowledge"
1991]
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of Corporations and Their Executives, 23 Wake Forest L.
Rev. 203, 205-06 (1988). Highly publicized places such as the
Chemical Control site in Elizabeth, New Jersey, Love Canal in
Niagara Falls, New York, the so-called "Valley of the Drums"
in Shepardsville, Kentucky, and the Stringfellow Acid Pits in
California had become tragic symbols of "corporate America's
reckless disregard of public health." Id. at 206. Thus, the ini-
tial thrust of criminal enforcement was directed toward reach-
ing these more obvious or egregious violations. McMurray &
Ramsey, Environmental Crime: The Use of Criminal Sanc-
tions in Enforcing Environmental Laws, 19 Loy. L.A.L. Rev.
1133, 1141 (1986).
Concerned that RCRA violators were usually able to slip
away unpunished because there was insufficient policing of
such toxic waste disposal, Congress amended RCRA in 1980,
greatly expanding the statute's scope of criminal enforcement.
See House Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess., Waste Disposal Site Survey 33, (Comm. Print 1979).
Most significantly, the 1980 Amendments established the first
felony sanctions for any federal environmental crime. RCRA §
3008(d), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1988).
Less than one year after the enactment of the 1980
Amendments to RCRA, the United states Department of Jus-
tice and the EPA initiated vigorous efforts to enforce the
stricter criminal sanctions of the federal environmental laws.
Habicht, supra p.11, at 10,479. In January 1981, EPA created
a new Office of Criminal Enforcement. McMurray & Ramsey,
supra p.12, at 1140. Since then, the government's aggressive
commitment to criminal enforcement has rapidly expanded.2
2. By early 1985, EPA had a staff of 20 specialized, full-time criminal investiga-
tors who were authorized to carry firearms. Comment, Marking Time: A Status Re-
port on the Clean Air Act Between Deadlines, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,022, 10,038 (1985). Currently, all of the investigative methods previously reserved
for more traditional crimes are commonly used in environmental crimes. Kafin &
Port, Environmental Enforcement: Criminal Sanctions Lead to Higher Fines and
Jail, Nat'l L.J., July 23, 1990, at 20, col. 4. For example, grand juries, electronic sur-
veillance, and secret informants help environmental criminal investigators to gather
evidence against polluters. Id.
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This dedication of law enforcement resources already has had
substantial impact.s
2. Criminally prosecuting corporate officials deters
environmental violations.
Deterrence through criminal prosecution is now a crucial
element in EPA's environmental enforcement policy. Kafin &
Port, supra p. 12, at 20. Criminal enforcement is directed not
only to corporations, but to individuals within corporations
who might be personally culpable. Habicht, supra p.11, at
10,480. EPA regulators now more commonly use the threat of
jail instead of fines as an enforcement weapon. Lavelle, En-
forcement and the EPA, 13 Nat'l L.J. 1, 48, Sept. 24, 1990.
The rationale is straightforward: individuals commit crimes,
corporations do not; individuals can go to jail, corporations
cannot. Habicht, supra p.11, at 10,480. Significantly, the im-
position of fines often does not affect corporate violators, be-
cause they may view even substantial fines as simply a cost of
doing business. Many such corporations may conclude that
paying the fine is more economical than the cost of complying
with certain environmental statutes. See Lavelle, supra p.13,
at 1.
To enhance deterrence of future environmental crimes,
EPA and the Department of Justice have recently adopted a
policy of charging the highest corporate officials with viola-
tions. Habicht, supra p.11, at 10,480. Over one half of all in-
dictments have been against corporate directors, presidents,
vice-presidents, or other policy-level officials. Id. The argu-
ment that managers "didn't know what their employees were
doing" is not a valid defense. Id. Moreover, the new Federal
Sentencing Guidelines Manual requires judges to deal much
more harshly than they have in the past with convicted envi-
3. Criminal prosecution of environmental crimes has recently soared. in fiscal
year 1989, the U.S. Department of Justice indicted 101 corporations and individuals,
and 107 pleas and convictions were entered. Kafin & Port, supra p. 12, at 20. These
prosecutions (half of which have been for RCRA violations) resulted in $12.7 million
in fines and more than 53 years of imprisonment. Id. In contrast, in 1985 fines
amounted to only $565,000 and prison sentences totalled five years. Id.
1991]
15
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
ronmental criminals, regardless of how high their corporate
rank. U.S. Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, §
201.1 (Nov. 1989). See also Starr & Kelly, Environmental
Crimes and the Sentencing Guidelines: The Time Has
Come... and It Is Hard Time, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,096 (Mar. 1990). By threatening the highest-ranking
responsible corporate officials with imprisonment, and by cap-
italizing on their fear of jail and the social stigma of criminal
status, enforcement authorities are able to achieve compliance
more effectively. Kafin & Port, supra p. 12, at 21.
3. Criminally prosecuting bad faith reporting en-
hances good faith compliance.
Enforcement activity is the key to voluntary compliance.
Kafin & Port, supra p. 12, at 20. The success of the EPA's
hazardous waste management enforcement policies depends
largely on voluntary reporting from the regulated industry. Id.
Because bad faith reporting violations threaten the integrity
of the entire reporting system, prosecution of bad faith re-
porting is necessarily one of EPA's highest enforcement pri-
orities. Id. Industry's failure to abide by RCRA's reporting re-
quirements could undermine RCRA's primary goals and
seriously threaten public health and the environment.
To prevent such a result, the regulated industry must not
deprive EPA of information material to its hazardous waste
investigations. In response to this concern, Congress, in the
1984 Amendments to RCRA, broadened section 3008(d)(3),
which penalizes false reporting, by imposing criminal penal-
ties upon one who knowingly omits material information.
Congress reasoned that these omissions "could obviously
cause grave harm to regulatory process. The conduct can be as
serious in nature as falsification of information submitted."
H.R. Rep. No. 198, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 54-55, reprinted in
1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5576, 5613-14. Congress
enacted these amendments to clarify that the knowing omis-
sion of material information in a report to the EPA is a crimi-
nal offense. Id.
[Vol. 8
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B. Omni Violated RCRA Section 3008(d)(3) When Ad-
ams Omitted Material Information in His Tele-
phone Report to Inspector Durden.
Defendants Barker and Canner were convicted of violat-
ing RCRA section 3008(d)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(3). The
statute reads, in pertinent part, that any person who
knowingly omits material information or makes any false
material . . . representation in any application, label,
manifest, record, report, permit, or other document filed,
maintained, or used for purposes of compliance with regu-
lations promulgated by the Administrator. . . shall, upon
conviction, be subject to a fine . . . or imprisonment.
42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(3).
A jury found both defendants responsible for the knowing
omission of material information in a report used for compli-
ance with RCRA regulations. The district court denied de-
fendants' motions for acquittal notwithstanding the verdict,
reasoning that Adams' omission of information relevant to a
hazardous waste spill in his telephone report to the EPA ful-
filled the elements of the crime. Because Barker and Adams
knew that omitting this information could influence Durden's
investigation, the information was material. Because they
chose to respond orally to an official EPA inquiry, their re-
sponse constituted a report within the meaning of the statute.
Because the announced purpose of Durden's inquiry was to
investigate a hazardous waste spill, both men knew or should
have known that their report was to be used for compliance
with EPA regulations.
Defendants argue here for the same restrictive interpreta-
tion of RCRA section 3008(d)(3) that was rejected by the dis-
trict court. In particular, they argue that "material informa-
tion" is only the ultimate fact or final answer to an EPA
investigation; that "report" means only a written and not an
oral report; and that no duty to comply with an EPA inquiry
exists unless that inquiry states a specific regulation with
which compliance is sought. The district court correctly re-
jected all three of these defense theories.
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1. Information omitted in Omni's report to Durden
was "material" to the EPA.
Both Barker and Adams knew an Omni truck had been
leaking around the time of the DWE spill. They knew the
leaking truck sometimes carried DWE, and that the truck
might well have been at the site of the spill at the time of the
spill. Whatever epistemological arguments defendants make
regarding the certainty of conclusions that might be drawn
from these facts, defendants cannot dispute the relevance of
this information to the investigation that Durden told them
she was conducting.
Omitted information is material to a government agency
when it has a "tendency to influence [a]gency action." H.R.
Rep. No. 198, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (construing RCRA sec-
tion 3008), reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
5576, 5614; see also United States v. Markham, 537 F.2d 187,
196 (5th Cir. 1976) (information material when it has a "natu-
ral tendency to influence, or be capable of affecting or influ-
encing, a governmental function"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041
(1977); United States v. Diaz, 690 F.2d 1352, 1357 (11th Cir.
1982) (information material when it has the capacity to "im-
pair or pervert" the agency's functioning). For an omission to
be material, the government does not necessarily have to rely
on it, and in fact may ignore it altogether. Diaz, 690 F.2d at
1357-58.
By this standard, the information withheld from Durden
was clearly material. Had Adams been more forthright, Dur-
den could have actively continued investigating the spill. In-
stead, Adams volunteered only that he did "not know the
source of the spill." (R. 4). This grudging lack of candor effec-
tively smothered Durden's investigation. Had Officer Egger
not come forward with his information about the leaking
truck, Durden's investigation might have died right there.
2. The scope of RCRA section 3008(d)(3) covers
oral statements as well as written documents.
Inspector Durden requested information from Omni, and
defendants chose to report that information orally. Nothing in
[Vol. 8
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Durden's written request or in Omni's telephone reply sug-
gests that Omni's reply was not a formal report in response to
a formal inquiry.
Nevertheless, defendants contend that section 3008(d)(3)
only pertains to written reports and not to oral communica-
tions such as Adams' August 9 phone call. In support, they
point to the statute's own language, which applies to "any ap-
plication, label, manifest, record, report, permit, or other doc-
ument." 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(3). They argue that each item in
this list, with the possible exception of "report," refers to a
writing. They then conclude that section 3008(d)(3) therefore
must refer only to writings. They suggest that Congress' ap-
pending "or other document" to the itemized list underscores
its intent to restrict application of the statute to written
documents.
Defendants' argument is only literal and not logical. Most
importantly, it discounts RCRA's underlying purpose.
Congress passed RCRA to regulate toxic materials be-
cause it viewed the improper disposal of these hazardous sub-
stances as a "serious national problem." United States v.
Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 666-67 (3d Cir. 1984).
The House Energy and Commerce Committee believed it im-
perative that the EPA conduct its enforcement program "in a
manner that controls and prevents present and potential en-
dangerment to public health and the environment." H.R. Rep.
No. 198, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 5576, 5579. This court therefore should
interpret the section 3008(d)(3) criminal sanctions to effect
their protective purpose and apply them with a view toward
achieving "maximum adherence." United States v. Little
Rock Sewer Comm., 460 F. Supp. 6, 8 (E.D. Ark. 1978)
(broadly construing the Clean Water Act's "false statement"
provision, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2), to achieve "maximum
adherence").
The United States does not ask the court to stray from
the statute's own language, but urges a reading of section
3008(d)(3) that is more consistent with RCRA's purpose. Had
Congress intended to limit section 3008(d)(3) to written in-
struments only, it could have done so by using the single word
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"document," instead of the more cumbersome "application,
label, manifest, record, report, permit, or other document." 42
U.S.C. § 6928(d)(3).
But Congress was not trying with this language to define
a class of "writings" or "documents." Instead, Congress was
trying to capture the probable range of situations in which
persons would be likely to exchange information with the
EPA. Almost all of these interchanges will take written form,
so naturally most of the statute's language refers to written
documents. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6925 (applications, permits); §
6922(a)(2) (labels); § 6922(a)(5) (manifests); § 6922(a)(1)
(records); § 6922(a)(6) (reports).
But this observation does not lead inevitably to the con-
clusion that section 3008(d)(3) be limited to writings. The
term "report," for example, may include communications in
both written and oral form. The EPA's own RCRA regula-
tions, when describing procedures to be followed in the event
of a release, fire, or explosion, use "report" to mean both writ-
ten and oral communication. Compare 40 C.F.R. § 264.56(j)
(1989) (owner must "submit a written report on the incident
to the Regional Administrator" within 15 days) with 40 C.F.R.
§ 264.56(d) (1989) (if necessary to protect human health, or
the environment outside the facility, the emergency coordina-
tor immediately should make a telephone report to National
Response Center). The EPA has insisted on oral reports under
other environmental acts as well. E.g., Texas Discharge Per-
mit Notice, 55 Fed. Reg. 23,405 (1990) (permit conditioned on
inclusion of "oral reporting" requirement under the Clean
Water Act section 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342).
The only logical basis for exempting oral reports from
RCRA's sanctions might be that parties' recollections of unre-
corded conversations may be unreliable. That is not a problem
here, because the wording of Omni's report is undisputed.
RCRA's purpose, its underlying regulations, and its statu-
tory language all counsel against restricting section 3008(d)(3)
to written documents. The consequences of a false or mislead-
ing report can be devastating, whether given orally or in writ-
ing. Nevertheless, defendants urge an interpretation of a stat-
ute that allows them to escape compliance with RCRA
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whenever they use a telephone instead of a typewriter. The
court should deny this implausible construction.
3. The subject matter of Omni's report falls within
the scope of RCRA section 3008(d)(3) because it
involves compliance with RCRA regulations.
RCRA section 3008(d)(3) penalizes the omission of mate-
rial information in a report to be "used for purposes of com-
pliance with [RCRAJ regulations." 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(3).
Durden's letter to Omni flatly stated that the purpose of the
EPA's inquiry was to investigate the source of a hazardous
waste spill. Investigating spills to enforce compliance with
waste management requirements is a basic EPA function. See
42 U.S.C. § 6927.
The law charges corporate officers with the knowledge
that their hazardous wastes are subject to EPA regulation.
The United States Supreme Court has declared that, when-
ever "obnoxious waste materials" are involved, "the
probability of regulation is so great that anyone who is aware
that he is . . . dealing with them must be presumed to be
aware of the regulation." United States v. International Min-
erals Corp., 402 U.S. 557, 565 (1971). Thus, when Omni's of-
ficers received Durden's inquiry, they were presumptively
presented with a request for information to be "used for pur-
poses of compliance with [RCRA] regulations." 42 U.S.C. §
6928(d)(3).
Defendants' claim that their duty of candor to the EPA is
triggered only when the Agency can cite to the specific regula-
tion with which it seeks compliance is unreasonable and self-
serving. They would have this court believe that, when a com-
pany experienced in handling and disposing of hazardous
waste receives an inquiry from the EPA about a toxic spill
that causes its front lawn to die, its officers had no idea that
the inquiry concerned possible RCRA violations.
If defendants truly had been uncertain about the precise
nature and purpose of the EPA's inquiry, they should have
raised these questions before Adams responded to Durden's
letter. Because they did not, the court should deem them to
[16]
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have waived, or at least estop them from asserting, this de-
fense. See United States v. Charles George Trucking Co., 823
F.2d 685, 691 (1st Cir. 1987) (failure to respond in a timely
fashion to EPA inquiry under RCRA section 3007(a) can be
seen as proof of intent to waive the opportunity).
Handlers of hazardous waste have an affirmative duty to
"furnish information relating to [hazardous] wastes" upon re-
quest of any EPA "officer, employee or representative."
RCRA § 3007(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6927(a). This duty both facili-
tates enforcement of RCRA statutes and assists in the devel-
opment of their underlying regulations. Id.; see also Charles
George Trucking Co., 823 F.2d at 689 (failure to honor EPA's
"inquisitorial authority" under RCRA section 3007(a) would
unduly handicap its ability to regulate hazardous waste). Ac-
cepting defendants' claim that they are only required to re-
spond to EPA inquiries under the very narrowest of circum-
stances would almost always prevent the EPA from enforcing
compliance with the reporting requirement.
When she wrote her letter, Durden knew only that DWE
had been spilled near the Omni plant and that several citizens
had complained of chemical odors from the spill. At that time
she did not know how the spill had happened, so she could
not know who had violated which regulations. The violation of
any of a broad spectrum of regulations could have been asso-
ciated with the spill. E.g., 40 C.F.R. § 264.14 (1989) (security
requirements for the facility); § 264.15 (1989) (requirements
for proper inspection of the facility); § 264.50 (1989) (contin-
gency plan and emergency procedures requirements).
Durden could have cited to any of these regulations, or all
of them, or even to the entire body of RCRA regulations, for
all she knew at the time. She could not know if any specific
regulation had been violated until she completed her investi-
gation. Defendants' assertion that no duty to cooperate with
an EPA investigation arises until the investigation has been
completed is absurd.
This argument is analogous to a driver refusing to stop at
a police barricade because he does not know the precise pur-
pose for which the barricade has been erected. Defendants'
tactic here is nothing more than a bald-faced attempt to evis-
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cerate a critical provision of RCRA's pollution prevention
arsenal.
A jury convicted Barker and Canner of violating RCRA
section 3008(d)(3). The district court considered RCRA's pur-
pose and rejected their suggestions that no crime had been
committed. This court should do the same.
C. Barker and Canner Violated RCRA section
3008(d)(3) Because They Were Responsible for
Withholding Material Information in a Report to
the EPA.
Canner and Barker are both responsible for conduct that
violated RCRA section 3008(d)(3). Evidence at trial estab-
lished that Barker, the plant manager, directed and knew of
this conduct. Canner, Omni's president, whose well-known
corporate philosophy apparently inspired his employees to vi-
olate RCRA, cannot avoid responsibility for the acts of those
employees. Both officers were aware or should have been
aware of that conduct and are liable for it under the "respon-
sible corporate officer" doctrine.
1. Barker violated RCRA section 3008(d)(3): (a)
when he knowingly instructed an employee to
omit material information in a report needed by
the EPA; and (b) because he is a "responsible
corporate officer."
The district court determined that Barker knew the con-
tents of Adams' statement to the EPA and that he knew or
should have known that statement omitted information mate-
rial to the EPA's investigation of a hazardous waste manage-
ment violation. The court found the charge against Barker
could be fully sustained under either of two theories: first,
that Barker actually knew of and directed Adams' omission of
material information; or, second, that Barker is liable under
the "responsible corporate officer" doctrine.
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a. Barker is guilty because he ordered Adams to withhold in-
formation Inspector Durden needed for her investigation.
The trial record shows that Barker instructed his em-
ployee, Arnold Adams, to omit material information in a re-
port to the EPA concerning the Agency's investigation of a
hazardous waste management violation. The violation is ag-
gravated by the fact that Barker actively instructed Adams
not to obtain information requested by the EPA and, effec-
tively, to stonewall the EPA by not reporting relevant infor-
mation already known to both men.
Barker received a specific inquiry from EPA Inspector
Durden concerning a hazardous waste spill just outside the
street gate of the Omni plant. Durden informed Barker she
was investigating and asked him if he knew the source of the
spill. Barker specifically instructed Adams not to obtain the
information necessary to make a good faith answer to this in-
quiry. Barker instructed Adams to say as little as possible,
and acknowledged Adams' cursory report to the EPA without
voicing any disapproval or reservation. If Barker had disap-
proved of Adams' answer or felt that Adams had misunder-
stood his directions, Barker easily could have corrected or
supplemented the report or told Adams to do so.
Barker does not dispute that he knew what Adams had
reported. He does not deny that he knew DWE was a regu-
lated hazardous waste, that an Omni truck was leaking at the
time of the spill, that the truck sometimes carried DWE, and
that the truck might have been at the spill site at the time of
the spill. The court found, therefore, that Barker was a person
who knowingly violated RCRA section 3008(d)(3).
At trial, Barker did not contest his knowledge, but argued
that the prosecution must prove that he "willed" or "in-
Tended" his employee to make a "false statement." Barker's
assertion is patently fanciful. First, a false statement is not
required. The statute explicitly sanctions "[a]ny person who.
knowingly omits material information" from an EPA in-
quiry. RCRA §§ 3008(d), 3008(d)(3) (emphasis added).
Barker's instructions to Adams show he intended Adams to
omit information material to the EPA investigation.
[19]
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Second, proof of Barker's guilt does not require a showing
that he purposefully intended to deceive the EPA. In United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., the United States Su-
preme Court stated that a defendant acts knowingly for pur-
poses of scienter if he is aware that a result is practically cer-
tain to follow from his conduct, whether or not he intends
that result. 438 U.S. 422, 445 (1978). In Gypsum, defendants
argued that telephone conversations ultimately having the ef-
fect of fixing prices were made in a good faith attempt to meet
pricing standards allowed by law. Id. at 444, 444 n.21. The
Court rejected this defense, refusing to require the prosecu-
tion to prove defendants consciously desired to fix prices or
violate the law; such proof is "both unnecessarily cumulative
and unduly burdensome." Id. at 446. Because the defendants
were sufficiently sophisticated to know that price-fixing was a
likely consequence of their telephone calls, they could be held
to have knowingly fixed prices. Id. at 445-46.
The district court's application of the law to the facts in
this case is completely consistent with Gypsum. Barker did
not want the EPA to learn anything about Omni's possible
involvement in the hazardous waste spill because an investiga-
tion might disrupt or curtail profits. Under the logic of Gyp-
sum, Barker is guilty even if he did not intend to mislead the
EPA, but only to enhance Omni's productivity; he acted
"knowingly" simply because he knew or should have known
that his actions would almost certainly frustrate the EPA's in-
vestigation of the hazardous waste spill. Barker's "knowledge"
of a material omission was culpable even under the restrictive
definition of "knowledge" that he himself proposes.
A fact finder may infer intent to violate RCRA from ac-
tions that are far less conclusive than these. In United States
v. Hayes International Corp., for instance, a corporate officer
received particularly advantageous terms in a hazardous waste
disposal contract. 786 F.2d 1499, 1504 (11th Cir. 1986). That,
and his failure to inquire into the contractor's disposal meth-
ods, were sufficient bases for the jury to infer the officer knew
the contractor was disposing of the wastes illegally. Id.
Here, similarly to Hayes, the jury reasonably could have
found that Barker knew or should have known that his orders
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to Adams would result in a RCRA violation. The record does
not support the theory that Adams, rather than Barker, was
responsible for this omission. When Adams suggested a more
appropriate response to Durden's inquiry, Barker told him
not to make it. Claiming that Barker is innocent because he
himself did not pronounce the offending words directly to the
EPA, but rather spoke them through his employee, is tanta-
mount to claiming that no employer can ever be guilty under
this statute because he can always instruct his secretary or as-
sistant to answer any EPA inquiry for him. That a master is
accountable for the actions of his servant is a basic principle
of the law of agency. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 25.
The master may be criminally liable for the authorized acts of
his servant even when the master had no criminal intent. Id. §
217D comment b. A master is normally penalized for violation
of statutory provisions by a servant acting within the scope of
his authority, even when master had no reason to anticipate
servant's conduct. Commissioner, Dep't of Transp. v. Cox, 83
Pa. Commw. 260, 262, 476 A.2d 1012, 1014 (1984). Barker in-
structed his employee to make the report in exactly the man-
ner it was made. He confirmed his approval of that report by
failing to disapprove, supplement, or correct it in any way. He
is responsible for the results of that report.
b. Even if Barker did not knowingly instruct Adams to vio-
late RCRA, Barker is guilty as a responsible corporate of-
ficer for failing to require the employee to comply with
RCRA.
The "responsible corporate officer" doctrine subjects re-
sponsible corporate officers to criminal liability without proof
of knowledge or intent. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658,
670 (1974). The doctrine is applicable whether or not the
crime requires "consciousness of wrongdoing," and is applica-
ble "to those who by virtue of their managerial positions or
other similar relation to the actor [actually committing the
wrong] could be deemed responsible for its commission." Id.
The doctrine is founded on the recognition that public
welfare statutes often "touch phases of the lives and health of
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people which, in circumstances of modern industrialism, are
largely beyond self-protection." United States v. Dotterweich,
320 U.S. 264, 280 (1943). Enforcement of such a statute re-
quires the abrogation of the conventional requirement of
awareness of wrongdoing: "In the interest of the larger good it
puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise
innocent but standing in responsible relation to a public dan-
ger." Id. at 280-81. The Supreme Court has explained that the
nature of modern corporations requires self-censorship, and
therefore that corporate officers are criminally accountable for
failing to exercise their authority and supervisory responsibil-
ity. Park, 421 U.S. at 671. Public welfare statutes may punish
"neglect where the law requires care, or inaction where it im-
poses a duty." Id. (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342
U.S. 246, 255 (1952)). By their very nature, these statutes im-
pose an affirmative duty on responsible corporate officers to
seek out and remedy violations. Park, 421 U.S. at 672.
The responsible corporate officer doctrine need not be in-
corporated explicitly into a statute in order to apply to viola-
tions of the statute. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 283-85. The stat-
utes under which corporate officers were convicted in
Dotterweich and Park did not mention the doctrine. Id.; cf.
Park, 421 U.S. at 670 (case law establishes availability of "re-
sponsible corporate officer" doctrine). Courts traditionally ap-
ply the responsible corporate officer doctrine when the pur-
pose of a statute is to protect the public health and welfare.
Park, 421 U.S. at 668. RCRA is such an act, and courts recog-
nize that the doctrine applies to its enforcement. See, e.g.,
United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 666-
68 (3d Cir. 1984).
Barker alleges that he is not a corporate officer responsi-
ble for Omni's conduct violating RCRA section 3008(d)(3).
The government has proven Barker is wrong. The prosecution
establishes a prima facie case that a defendant is in "respon-
sible relationship" to such conduct
when it introduces evidence sufficient to warrant a finding
by the trier of the facts that the defendant had, by reason
of his position in the corporation, responsibility and au-
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thority either to prevent the first instance, or promptly to
correct, the violation complained of, and that he failed to
do so.
Park, 421 U.S. at 673-74.
Barker was in charge of environmental compliance at the
Omni plant; he was informed of the EPA inquiry; he directly
authorized the response that omitted information necessary to
the EPA inquiry; and he failed to correct that omission. More-
over, Congress' amendment of section 3008(d)(3) to prohibit
expressly the omission of material information from a report
indicates legislative recognition that corporate officers must
not be allowed to hide behind a restrictive understanding of
reporting requirements. H.R. Rep. No. 198, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 54-55, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News 5576, 5613-14. Congress imposed a broad reporting duty
because it recognized that RCRA's vital mission can only be
carried out successfully with the full and active cooperation of
corporate officers. As the district court correctly determined,
Barker's position of responsibility in the corporate hierarchy
makes him doubly liable.
2. Canner is guilty because he is the officer ulti-
mately responsible for Omni's compliance with
the EPA's request.
In "providing sanctions which reach and touch the individuals
who execute the corporate mission," a legislative act
imposes not only a positive duty to seek out and remedy
violations when they occur but also, and primarily, a duty
to implement measures that will insure that violations do
not occur. The requirements of foresight and vigilance
imposed on responsible corporate agents are beyond ques-
tion demanding, and perhaps onerous, but they are no
more stringent than the public has a right to expect of
those who voluntarily assume positions of authority in
business enterprises whose services and products affect
the health and well-being of the public that supports
them.
[23]
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Park, 421 U.S. at 672.
In Park, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the
chief executive officer of a retail food chain for violating
health standards set by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act. Id. Although the officer testified that his management
system required his reliance on subordinates, the Court found
him accountable, "because of the responsibility and authority
of his position, for the conditions which gave rise to the
charges against him." Id. at 675.
Likewise, Canner cannot escape responsibility for Omni's
violation of RCRA section 3008(d)(3) merely by asserting that
he had delegated responsibility for plant management to
Barker. Canner's well-known business philosophy places every
emphasis on profitability and directs employees not to pay at-
tention to anything else. His "Commandments of Business
Success" are: "1. Pay attention to profits. 2. Pay still more
attention to profits. 3. If you're paying attention to anything
but profits, you probably shouldn't be." This business philoso-
phy, in which he indoctrinated his employees through fre-
quent memos and a company newsletter, created "the condi-
tions which gave rise to the charges against him." Park, 421
U.S. at 675. These conditions affected Barker, who as a result
gave the direct orders violating section 3008(d)(3). Barker ad-
monished Adams that, "if we spent time chasing down leads
for [the EPA,] we'd never make any money."
Nor can Canner's claim that he had no knowledge of the
particular EPA inquiry absolve him of responsibility. Al-
though he was aware his business involved the handling of
hazardous waste, Canner chose to reroute all correspondence
concerning environmental compliance to Barker. The law im-
poses an affirmative duty to seek out violations and to imple-
ment measures to insure that violations will not occur. Park,
421 U.S. at 672. An executive cannot insulate himself from
liability by willfully choosing to ignore environmental issues.
Id.
Canner did not meet his duty to ensure the fulfillment of
environmental regulations with the single, abrupt generaliza-
tion in his company's procedures manual that environmental
regulations are important. As a successful manager, Canner
1991]
29
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
knows well this generalization carries little weight in the face
of his repeated messages to the contrary that nothing but
profit is important.
Canner's conviction is not only just, it is necessary to pro-
tect the public from corporate mismanagement of hazardous
waste. Strict enforcement of RCRA's criminal penalties
against corporate officers is essential to the EPA's enforce-
ment program. See Habicht, supra p.11, at 10,480. Where the
dollar costs of compliance with environmental laws far exceed
the cost of civil fines to a company, the threat of criminal
sanction against officers who establish and carry out company
policies is often the only effective means to insure that com-
pliance. Canner's own words make clear that Omni's sole pri-
ority is to make money; nothing other than profit-making
merits his consideration. This attitude can be lethal. It must
be rooted out.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the United States re-
spectfully requests the court to affirm the district court's
judgment finding both defendants guilty of violating RCRA
section 3008(d)(3).
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